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Abstract 
I argue that citizens initiated referenda (CIR) should be legally binding. While referenda 
are an established part of New Zealand’s constitutional framework, ordinary citizens only 
have the power to initiate nonbinding CIR. A system of binding CIR (BCIR) would be an 
improvement. Firstly, BCIR would give greater respect to individual citizens’ rationality, 
freedom and equality. Secondly, BCIR would make New Zealand more democratic. 
Thirdly, BCIR would have a number of instrumental benefits. Various arguments can be 
advanced in defence of the current representative democratic paradigm. They include 
common arguments such as those regarding voter incompetence, tyranny of the majority, 
and incompatibility with current governing arrangements. They are all flawed. In short, the 
people can be trusted to govern themselves. I finish my argument by providing an example 
of how the process of direct democratic lawmaking might work in New Zealand. It differs 
significantly from the current CIR process, but I do not mean to set it in stone. I use it to 
show how proper institutional design can refute some counterarguments. The final form 
will be decided upon by the people and their representatives. 
  
Key words: Citizens Initiated Referenda; direct democracy; representative government  
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I Introduction 
 
In this paper, I address the question of how New Zealand’s constitution might be made 
more consistent with the ideal of direct democracy. In particular, I argue that citizens 
initiated referenda1 (CIR) should be legally binding in New Zealand. This paper has five 
sections. Section I is an introduction. It establishes the context for this paper. It is divided 
into two parts. Part A explores the definition of ‘democracy’ and establishes the place of 
CIR within the nomenclature of democracy. Part B gives an account of the constitutional 
context within which CIR operate in New Zealand. Section II sets out the positive case for 
binding CIR (BCIR). Part A thereof makes the case that BCIR would give greater 
recognition to the rationality, freedom, and equality of the human individual. Part B argues 
that adopting BCIR would make New Zealand more democratic. Part C sets out a number 
of instrumental arguments for BCIR. Section III refutes several common arguments against 
direct democracy generally and BCIR in particular. These include the arguments from voter 
incompetence, tyranny of the majority, and incompatibility with current governing 
arrangements. The counterarguments can be stated positively as arguments for the virtues 
of representative democracy. Section IV sets out a model of how BCIR could work 
practically in New Zealand. Its purpose is to show how proper institutional design can 
dispatch some of the counterarguments. Section V concludes the argument.  
A Terminology 
 
The word ‘democracy’ stems from the Greek roots demos, meaning ‘people’, and kratos, 
meaning ‘rule’ or ‘power’. Thus, democracy literally means ‘people rule’ or ‘rule by the 
people’.2 Lijphart writes that the literal meaning likely remains “the most basic and most 
widely used definition”.3 It is the touchstone for all more scholarly definitions. However, 
beyond that etymological definition, democracy is said to be an “essentially contested 
                                                 
1 I prefer the Latinate plural, if for no other reason than its greater elegance than the Anglo-Saxon. 
2 Or ‘people power’. 
3 Arend Lijphart Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984) at 1. 
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concept”.4 In other words, democracy means many different things to many different 
people.  
 
Nonetheless, extrapolating from the literal definition, Lijphart writes that, “An ideal 
democratic government would be one whose actions were always in perfect 
correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens.” I would add that there must be 
some mechanism to guarantee that the government’s actions correspond to citizens’ 
preferences. A dictator’s decisions could coincidentally correspond to those preferences, 
but that would not make the regime democratic. In light of this, I adopt Saward’s definition 
of democracy as a political system that “creates a necessary correspondence between acts 
of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to those acts”.5 
This encapsulates the essence of rule by the people. Indeed, Budge writes that, “Democracy 
as such can hardly be conceived in other terms”.6  
 
There are various ways of classifying democracies. One classification distinguishes 
between direct and indirect democracy. In the latter, elected representatives of the people 
ultimately make policy decisions. The people are said to rule indirectly, through their 
representatives. In a direct democracy, the people themselves make the decisions. 
 
The ideal direct democracy would consist of a comprehensive, unmediated, and 
unrestrained system of popular voting, whereby the people directly decided all major 
political decisions.7 The people would replace Parliament as the legislature. However, 
advocates generally conceive of direct democracy not as a replacement but as an adjunct 
                                                 
4 W B Gallie “Essentially Contested Concepts” (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New 
Series) 167 at 180, 183–186; see generally Howard A Doughty “Democracy as an Essentially Contested 
Concept” (2014) 19 The Innovation Journal 1. 
5 Michael Saward The Terms of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge (UK), 1998) at 51. 
6 Ian Budge “Implementing popular preferences: Is direct democracy the answer?” in Brigitte Geissel and 
Kenneth Newton (eds) Evaluating democratic innovations: Curing the democratic malaise? (Routledge, 
New York, 2012) 23 at 23. 
7 Ian Budge The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge (UK), 1996) at 37. 
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for existing representative institutions.8 Referenda are a mechanism of direct democracy, 
but in practice they invariably exist in the context of a representative democratic system. 
 
A referendum is “a general vote by the electorate on a single political question which has 
been referred to them for a direct decision”.9 A CIR is a referendum triggered by ordinary 
citizens, rather than the government, potentially against the government’s will. It enables 
citizens to force an issue onto the politico-legislative agenda and to force a vote on the 
issue. CIR can be distinguished from government initiated or controlled referenda, which 
governments can use at their discretion, and from constitutionally required or ‘mandatory’ 
referenda, which a constitution requires be held to adopt certain policies.10 Referenda are 
an established part of New Zealand’s constitutional framework. 
B Referenda in New Zealand 
 
A constitution is the “system or body of fundamental principles under which a nation is 
constituted or governed”.11 Democracy is one of the broad principles underlying New 
Zealand’s constitution.12 “New Zealand is a representative democracy, with a Parliament 
consisting of members who represent the voters that elected them. … [V]oters’ views are 
considered and acted on indirectly via their members of Parliament.”13 New Zealand 
inherited its constitutional structure from the United Kingdom.14 New Zealand was once 
                                                 
8 Harel Arnon A Theory of Direct Legislation (LFB Scholarly Publishing, New York, 2008) at 21–22, 51. 
9 Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite (eds) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (12th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011) at 1208. 
10 David Butler and Austin Ranney “Theory” in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums: A 
Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, 1978) 23 at 24. 
11 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government (4th 
ed, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2004) at 4 (emphasis added).  
12 At 5. 
13 Nigel Roberts “Referendums – Representative democracy and referendums” (13 July 2012) Te Ara – The 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz>. 
14 Jack Vowles and others Towards Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to 
Proportional Representation (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995) at 193. 
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considered the paragon of this ‘Westminster’ paradigm.15 It features an indirectly elected 
executive government (Cabinet) drawn from and responsible to the triennially elected, 
sovereign Parliament. The triennial election is the principal means by which the people 
hold their government to account.  
 
Nonetheless, referenda have a long pedigree in New Zealand. Liquor licensing polls were 
instituted as early as 1881.16 Local option polls for each electorate were introduced in 1894. 
From 1896, they were held alongside every election.17 Additionally, simultaneous national 
referenda on alcohol were held with almost every election from 191118 to 1987.19 They 
offered a choice among prohibition, state control, and the status quo of licensing and 
regulation.20 Under the Local Restoration Polls Act 1990, votes on restoring liquor 
licensing continue to be held in the five remaining ‘no-licence’ districts along with general 
elections.21 
 
Furthermore, governments have initiated ten referenda on largely constitutional and moral 
topics between 1949 and 2011. In 1949, referenda were held on hotel licensing hours 
(defeated), off-course betting on horse races (successful), and compulsory military training 
(successful).22 Two were held in 1967, one approving the extension of hotel licensing 
hours23 and the other refusing to extend the parliamentary term to four years.24 Another 
                                                 
15 John Wanna “New Zealand’s Westminster trajectory: Archetypal transplant to maverick outlier” in Haig 
Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller Westminster legacies: Democracy and responsible government in 
Asia and the Pacific (University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005) 153 at 153. 
16 Alan McRobie “Appendix 5: Previous Referendums” in Colin James and Alan McRobie (eds) Turning 
Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 318 at 318. 
17 Leslie Lipson The Politics of Equality: New Zealand’s Adventures in Democracy (2nd ed, Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2011) at 160. 
18 At 160–161. 
19 McRobie, above n 16, at 318. 
20 Lipson, above n 17, at 160–161. 
21 Laws of New Zealand Elections (online ed) at [173]. 
22 Nigel Roberts “Consultative referendums before 1970” (13 July 2012) Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz>. 
23 Roberts, above n 22. 
24 Nigel Roberts “Constitutional referendums” (13 July 2012) Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand 
<www.teara.govt.nz>. 
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referendum on extending the term of Parliament was defeated in 1990.25 A referendum on 
making superannuation compulsory was defeated in 1997.26 The current government has 
had passed legislation under which referenda will be held on changing the national flag.27 
 
Most significantly, in 1993, New Zealanders voted to replace the plurality FPP electoral 
system with MMP.28 That followed a 1992 indicative referendum which demonstrated a 
desire for change and a preference for MMP, over several alternatives, to go up against 
FPP.29 In 2011, another government-initiated referendum on the electoral system 
confirmed this result.30 The change to MMP has reformed the way in which Parliaments, 
and thus governments, are chosen. It has therefore had major implications for the full 
spectrum of representative decision-making in New Zealand.31 
 
It is standard practice for governments to have passed specific legislation enabling 
referenda to be held. Certainly, legislation is needed for the results to bind the Crown, there 
being no general legislative power enabling binding referenda. Naturally, Parliament, being 
sovereign, has unconditional authority to legislate to hold referenda. Thus, the government 
can hold indicative postal referenda by Order in Council32 (it can also order that CIR be 
held by post).33 Various legislative provisions exist providing for referenda to be held at 
the local authority level.34 In addition, certain entrenched provisions in significant 
                                                 
25 Roberts, above n 24. 
26 Nigel Roberts “Referendums – Consultative referendums after 1990” (13 July 2012) Te Ara – The 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz>. 
27 New Zealand Flag Referendums Act 2015, s 3. 
28 Vowles and others, above n 14, at 1. 
29 Palmer and Palmer, above n 11, at 13. 
30 Therese Arseneau and Nigel S Roberts “‘Kicking the tyres’ on MMP: The results of the referendum 
reviewed” in Jon Johansson and Stephen Levine (eds) Kicking the tyres: The New Zealand general election 
and electoral referendum of 2011 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2012) 325 at 332–333. 
31 Palmer and Palmer, above n 11, at 13–18. 
32 Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000, s 5(a). 
33 Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000, s 5(b). 
34 Local Electoral Act 2001, ss 9(1), 9(7), 19ZB, 19ZD, 29, 31; Local Government Act 2002, ss 131–132; 
sch 3, cls 23–25, 28; and Local Restoration Polls Act.  
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constitutional statutes can only be repealed by a simple majority in a referendum or a 75% 
super majority in Parliament.35 
 
Moreover, Chote argues that a constitutional convention has emerged in New Zealand 
requiring that referenda be held to determine matters of constitutional significance.36 Her 
conclusion that significant political actors recognise an obligation to take matters of 
constitutional significance to the people appears valid. Chen agrees that there is an evolving 
convention to that effect.37 More importantly, in announcing a referendum on changing the 
New Zealand flag, Prime Minister John Key stated that, “It’s [sic] constitutional in my 
view, and constitutional matters have to be taken to the people”.38 He drew an explicit 
parallel with the 2011 MMP referendum, saying that “in principle, it’d [sic] have to be part 
of a referendum just like it was for MMP”.39 Clearly, at least some influential political 
elites believe changes to the electoral system require acceptance by the people. 
 
At present in New Zealand, ordinary citizens can only trigger purely advisory, non-binding 
CIR, under the CIR Act 1993.40 The Act emerged from the same disillusionment with New 
Zealand’s democracy as did MMP.41 Five CIR have been held since the CIR Act was 
introduced.42 Only one of the five has led to any policy change; the others were ignored.43 
                                                 
35 Electoral Act 1993, s 268. However, it is unclear whether the courts would enforce this section. 
36 Alice Chote “An Obligation to Ask: A Constitutional Convention for Constitutional Referendums in New 
Zealand” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012) at 24. 
37 Mai Chen Public Law Toolbox (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at 1088. 
38 Stacey Kirk “Time to change the flag. To what?” (29 January 2014) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. The first 
clause of this sentence, however, is debatable. The issue is a symbolic one, because the flag is a symbol of 
New Zealand. Nonetheless, it has no real effect on how we govern ourselves, that is, on how public power is 
exercised in this country. 
39 Kirk, above n 38. 
40 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at [10.4.1]; see generally Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. 
41 This is the usual explanation, although Parkinson rather darkly suggests the impetus was conservative 
forces opposed to homosexual law reform: John Parkinson “Who Knows Best? The Creation of the Citizens 
Initiated Referendum in New Zealand” (2001) 36 Gov’t & Oppos 403 at 408–409. 
42 Chen, above n 37, at 1087. 
43 The 1999 criminal justice referendum resulted in stricter parole and sentencing conditions and increased 
importance being given to victims’ rights: Chen, above n 37, at 52–53. 
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This record has sparked calls for the Act to be reformed44 or even repealed.45 This paper 
argues instead that CIR should be made binding.  
  
II The Case for Binding CIR 
 
The literal definition of democracy raises the questions of whom the people are and how 
they should rule.46 I assume that ‘the people’ are the adult population of the state, 
enfranchised under (virtually) universal suffrage. My concern is with determining how the 
people should rule. 
A The argument from individual rationality 
 
Respect for individual rationality, liberty, and equality suggest that individuals should have 
a say in collective decisions. Binding CIR would provide such a say. I start from first 
principles. The subjects of any politico-legal system are humans. Humanity, Aristotle tells 
us, “is by nature a political animal”.47 That is because humanity “alone among the animals 
[has] the power of reasoned speech”.48 Humans, in other words, are rational. Binding CIR 
would give greater respect to rationality, for three reasons. Firstly, BCIR would recognise 
that individuals are capable of making rational decisions. Secondly, BCIR would act on 
that recognition by giving individuals the chance to exercise their rational faculties. 
Thirdly, in so doing, they would encourage individual participation in the political process, 
thus stimulating the development of those rational faculties.49 
 
                                                 
44 Caroline Morris “Citizens’ Referenda: time to review?” [2002] NZLJ 44; and Caroline Morris “Improving 
Our Democracy or a Fraud on the Community? A Closer Look at New Zealand’s Citizens Initiated Referenda 
Act 1993” (2004) 25 Stat LR 116. 
45 Bridget Fenton and Andrew Geddis “Citizens initiated referenda” [2009] NZLJ 334 at 336. 
46 Anthony H Birch The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy (3rd ed, Routledge, London, 2007) at 
111. 
47 Aristotle The Politics (T A Sinclair (translator)) (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969) at 28. 
48 At 28. 
49 See John Stuart Mill Considerations on Representative Government (eBook ed, Project Gutenberg, 2013) 
at ch 3. 
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From the fact of rationality, we can derive the value of political freedom. Humans are 
rational. Humans are therefore capable of identifying and acting in accordance with their 
own interests. Simultaneously, abstract moral reasoning enables us to think of others and 
to do what is right. Therefore, humans can and should be left free to make their own 
decisions and to run their own lives to the greatest degree reasonably possible. In other 
words, individuals should have liberty.50 However, for certain purposes, humans are 
compelled to act collectively rather than individually.51 Freedom continues to demand that 
everyone have a say in the decisions that affect them. Hence, the liberty afforded to 
individuals should be preserved on the collective plane as much as reasonably possible. 
 
Furthermore, each individual should have an equal say in collective decisions. Modern 
Westerners adhere to a doctrine of universal, intrinsic human equality.52 We accept the 
existence of fundamental human rights, defined as those rights we possess simply because 
we are human.53 The characteristic that gives rise to humanity’s special moral worth is its 
rational nature.54 We recognise all of humanity as equally possessed of this rational human 
nature. Therefore, all humans are equally suited to rule. Thus, we believe in political 
equality. Political equality refers to a state of affairs where “citizens have an equal voice in 
government decisions”.55 Humanity’s intrinsic equality should be preserved in the political 
sphere as much as reasonably possible. 
 
                                                 
50 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2012) at 21–27, ch 3; and 
John Locke Second Treatise of Government (eBook ed, Project Gutenberg, 2014) at [4]–[6], [22], [57]–[63]. 
51 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (eBook ed, Project Gutenberg, 2014) at ch 17; and Jean-Jacque Rousseau The 
Social Contract and Discourses (G D H Cole (translator)) (eBook ed, Project Gutenberg, 2014) at ch 6. 
52 Stefan Gosepath “Equality” (27 June 2007) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu> at [2.3]. 
53 Micheline R Ishay The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 2004) at 3; and Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003) at 9. 
54 Patrick Lee and Robert P George “The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity” (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 173 at 
187. 
55 Sidney Verba “Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?” (2003) 1 Perspectives 
on Politics 663 at 663.  
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The principles of universal human equality and individual liberty, which modern 
philosophy accepts derive from humanity’s rational nature,56 speak in favour of BCIR. 
Equality favours BCIR for two reasons. Firstly, BCIR give everyone a formally and 
substantively equal say in collective decisions. Secondly, BCIR also give everyone a 
formally equal opportunity to initiate proposals. Binding CIR would decrease the power 
imbalance between people and Parliament, increasing equality. Liberty favours BCIR, 
because every individual who votes in a referendum is a decision-maker, in two senses. 
Not only is everyone given the chance to make up their minds but also a guaranteed chance 
at affecting the outcome. Although one vote is of infinitesimal effect, it in principle affects 
the decision. Furthermore, BCIR enable the people to decide which issues they wish to 
decide directly and which to leave to representatives. This would increase the degree to 
which it could be said the people had consented to Parliament’s laws, increasing freedom. 
Binding CIR would therefore make human individuals more free and equal. 
B Greater democracy 
 
I noted above that humans are compelled to act collectively for certain purposes. Certainly, 
some would argue, with Madison, that “[i]f men were angels, no government would be 
necessary”.57 Others would say, with Aristotle and St Aquinas, that the political association 
is natural.58 Either way, I take for granted the existence of the political collective. This we 
call ‘the people’ or demos. 
 
                                                 
56 Immanuel Kant The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as 
the Science of Right (W Hastie (translator)) (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1887) at 56. 
57 James Madison “Checks and Balances” in Benjamin Fletcher Wright (ed) The Federalist (Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1961) 355 at 356; see also Augustine City of God 
(Henry Bettenson (translator)) (Penguin Books, London, 2003) at 874–875. 
58 Aristotle, above n 47, at 28; and Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae (Concerning the dominion which 
belonged to man in the state of innocence) (R W Dyson (translator)) in R W Dyson (ed) Aquinas: Political 
Writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2002) 1 at 4. 
13 In Defence of Direct Democracy: Towards a Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand 
 
The most basic principle of democracy is that these demoi are entitled to rule themselves.59 
Binding CIR would better enable the people to self-rule.60 Rule, or government, is 
concerned with making decisions that affect the governed entity. An entity that makes 
decisions itself can be said to self-rule. The ideal form of self-government over a polity 
would involve the people directly shaping and deciding all policy issues.61 Binding CIR 
provide the people the chance both to make those decisions by voting and to shape which 
issues arise for decision-making.62 They would thus enable the New Zealand people to self-
rule to a greater degree. 
 
In other words, adopting BCIR would make New Zealand more democratic. CIR are a 
superior democratic instrument to general elections. Elections are fought on a wide range 
of policies, encompassing every area of state activity. Also relevant are the ideologies of 
the parties and voters, the personalities, probity, and competence of the candidates, and 
voters’ satisfaction with their lives and government. It is extremely difficult to discern a 
signal to politicians from amidst all this noise. That is, it is difficult to determine what a 
majority of voters think on any one policy based on the results of a general election. 
Referenda enable us to determine the will of the people on any one issue. Additionally, but 
the binding nature of BCIR guarantees that they will get the result they want. It is surely 
odd that a self-professedly democratic country as New Zealand has no way of ensuring this 
already. As Saward puts it, “direct democracy is more democratic than representative 
democracy”.63 
It is entirely valid to argue that the people should not rule, at least not directly, but we 
should be clear that that is the argument being made. That argument is that the best form 
of government is not democracy but representative government. What we have now is, as 
Schumpeter notes, rule by politicians (namely elected representatives) not rule by the 
                                                 
59 Arnon, above n 8, at 21. 
60 See at 21. 
61 Arnon, above n 8, at 21. 
62 Kris W Kobach The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland (Dartmouth, Aldershot (England), 
1993) at 61. 
63 Saward, above n 5, at 83. 
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people.64 In theory the people rule indirectly, through representatives. However, they 
cannot be said to rule meaningfully when politicians can ignore CIR and make major 
moral/social (exempli gratia, same-sex marriage) and constitutional (appeal to the Privy 
Council) changes without campaigning on that basis. Binding CIR would be a modest step 
towards remedying this situation.  
 
A similar argument is that public policy decisions should be as politically legitimate as 
possible and that direct democracy maximises this legitimacy.65 Legitimacy has two 
aspects. Firstly, the citizenry must believe that political decisions do not exceed the bounds 
of substantive fairness and decency.66 The people is patently unlikely to make such a 
decision. Secondly, the citizenry must believe that political decisions are made the right 
way, that is, that they are procedurally correct.67 Since the people trust themselves more 
than politicians, they regard political decisions where everyone participates or has a chance 
to participate as procedurally superior.68 
 
Essentially, anyone who values democracy should see direct democracy as an ideal. 
Binding CIR would bring us closer to that ideal. This argument should satisfy those who 
believe democracy is intrinsically valuable as an end in itself. Yet BCIR would also provide 
certain instrumental benefits as a means to an end. 
C Practical arguments 
1 Agenda-setting 
 
The promise of BCIR is that anyone who has a good idea has a chance to have that idea 
transformed into a law. Binding CIR would provide an opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
put important issues on the legislative agenda. For various reasons, Parliament refuses to 
                                                 
64 Joseph A Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (eBook ed, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003) 
at 284–285. 
65 Butler and Ranney, above n 10, at 24. 
66 At 24. 
67 At 24. 
68 At 25. 
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deal with some issues. On some issues, cross-party consensus exists. On others, politicians 
refuse to deal with the issue for fear of electoral backlash. 
 
Political actors can also make commitments to keep issues off the agenda. In February 
2015, The Dominion Post (which usually opposes referenda69) editorialised that:70 
 
Prime Minister John Key has killed off any possibility of progress with this problem by 
promising to resign rather than increase the age of eligibility [for superannuation]. That 
means no sensible reform during the lifetime of the National Government. A strong 
suspicion remains that his finance minister doesn't agree with him about this, but Key is 
essential to the National Government and Bill English isn’t [sic]. A referendum would 
bypass the unshiftable obstacle of Key and return the issue to the people. 
 
In an effort to break the “Mexican Standoff” on the issue, the ACT Party’s leader and sole 
MP, David Seymour, had proposed a referendum.71 Doubtless, ACT is a government 
support party and the proposed referendum would have been government-initiated. Yet this 
illustrates the type of problem BCIR could resolve.  
2 A check on government power 
 
Despite the introduction of MMP, New Zealand remains at the bottom of the OECD in 
terms of institutional restraints on policymaking power.72 While the structures that led to 
New Zealand being described as having an ‘elective dictatorship’,73 ‘unbridled power’,74 
and ‘the fastest law in the west’75 have been attenuated by MMP, New Zealand remains 
                                                 
69 The Dominion Post “Referendums a waste of money” (17 December 2013) <www.dompost.co.nz>; and 
The Dominion Post “‘No’ to binding referendums” (24 July 2014) <www.dompost.co.nz>. 
70 The Dominion Post “Let the people solve super problem” (26 February 2015) <www.dompost.co.nz>. 
71 David Seymour “David Seymour challenges political leaders to support NZ Super referendum” (press 
release, 21 February 2015). 
72 John Wilson Parliamentary Voting Systems in New Zealand and the Referendum on MMP (Parliamentary 
Library, Research Paper 2011/03, November 2011) at 12–14. 
73 Richard Mulgan “The elective dictatorship in New Zealand” in Hyam Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Perspective (3rd ed, Longman Paul, Auckland, 1992) 513 at 513–515. 
74 See generally Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987). 
75 At 139. 
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remarkably centralised. The Parliament is unicameral, and the state itself is unitary. The 
Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) is neither entrenched nor supreme, and there is no supreme 
law of any kind. 
 
BCIR would bring about a diffusion of political power over the widest possible range of 
persons; as Lord Acton so famously said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”.76 BCIR would enable the people to veto statutes, regulations, and 
government policy decisions. They would therefore provide a check on the power of the 
government—broadly defined as including all three branches of government, Parliament 
among them. Dicey himself, the most famous exponent of parliamentary sovereignty, 
advocated the use of veto referenda to prevent the passage of fundamental constitutional 
changes.77 Now, Dicey opposed CIR.78 However, while CIR undoubtedly have the 
potential to be of wider application, they could perform the role of veto referenda. Were 
Parliament, for instance, to extend the term of Parliament unilaterally, a petition could be 
launched and a CIR held on repealing the offending statute. Even better, the fear of a CIR 
being held could dissuade Parliament from doing so in the first place. 
3 A check on the influence of other groups 
 
Various sectional interest groups wield power over the government. By lobbying and 
pressuring the government and other MPs, these groups can influence the policy process. 
This is not necessarily democratically illegitimate; such groups have their place. Indeed, 
interest groups are at the heart of the ‘pluralist’ conception of democracy79 in which our 
MPs believe.80 On the other hand, it is strongly suspected that such groups can, out of self-
interest, pressure the government into refraining from legislating in the public interest. 
                                                 
76 B J Palmer The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) 
at 1. 
77 Rivka Weill “Dicey Was Not Diceyan” (2003) 62 CLJ 474 at 486. 
78 At 486. 
79 Raymond Miller Democracy in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2015) at 232–238; 
and Xavier Marquez “Pluralism” in Janine Hayward (ed) New Zealand Government and Politics (6th ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 74 at 74–76. 
80 Miller, at 232. 
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Indeed, Marquez writes that pluralism is essentially incompatible with the populist notion 
that the people can manifest themselves in a unified manner in pursuit of a common good.81 
While Marquez appears sceptical of this idea,82 the very point of having political authority 
is to pursue the common good.  
 
Often, various groups can influence the government by threatening electoral punishment. 
The electors, of course, are quite immune to such threats. They are also far less susceptible 
to wealthy lobbyists. Their sheer number makes it impossible to lobby them.  
 
There is also the international factor. Treaties can place effective substantive limits on New 
Zealand’s ability to govern itself. In an increasingly globalised world, more and more 
constraints are being placed on the country’s ability to govern itself. Establishing an 
additional locus of power would counterbalance this tendency. 
 
III The Case against Binding CIR 
 
The paradigmatic mode of democracy in the present era is representative. That being so, 
there are good arguments for this state of affairs, which cannot simply be dismissed as 
elitism and self-interest. 
A Referenda are impractical  
 
Mill once wrote that “since all can not, in a community exceeding a single small town, 
participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows 
that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative”.83 This view retains 
currency among those who see direct democracy as an ideal.84 The argument seems quite 
outdated. Indeed, Mill had earlier written that contemporary means of mass transport and 
                                                 
81 Marquez, above n 79, at 76. 
82 At 76–77. 
83 Mill, above n 49, at ch 3. 
84 Arnon, above n 8, at 21; and Kobach, above n 62, at 56. 
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communication (newspapers and railways) had the potential to “enable the people on all 
decisive occasions to form a collective will, and render that collective will irresistible”.85 
Technology, of course, has vastly improved since then. Thanks to “the ease and speed of 
transmission of information we enjoy today”, writes Manzo, who adopts an unfavourable 
attitude to direct democracy, “the issues of geography and citizen numbers can be taken 
care of easily enough”.86 
 
While it is true that the people cannot deliberate in the same manner as MPs can,87 they 
can approximate legislative deliberation. Referendum proposals will tend to emerge from 
out of a period of spirited public debate. The fact that a referendum, let alone a binding 
referendum, is to be held on the subject will also tend to foster debate. During the course 
of such debate, the contours of the arguments on both sides will be repeatedly canvassed. 
 
B ‘The clarion call’: The voters are incompetent 
“Again and again,” Kobach writes, “one hears the clarion call of opponents of direct 
democracy: the people are not competent to govern themselves”.88 Thus, Butler and 
Ranney argue that public policy issues are too “numerous, complex, and demanding” for 
ordinary voters to understand properly.89 Only fulltime politicians have enough time to 
devote to casting informed votes.90 The facts are otherwise. After reviewing seven recent 
books on referenda, Qvortrup concludes that voters can make complex and informed 
decisions consistent with their preferences.91 Even if voters lack a comprehensive 
                                                 
85 John Stuart Mill “Civilization” (1836) 3 London and Westminster Review 1 at 7. 
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Paper) at 9. 
88 Kobach, above n 62, at 62. 
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90 At 34. 
91 Matt Qvortrup “Power to the People! But How? The Different Uses of Referendums Around the World” 
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understanding of the issues, they can use cues, heuristics and information shortcuts that 
grant them the discernment to “see through propaganda and spin” and make rational 
choices.92 For instance, they can rely on knowledge of the preferences of others. This 
enables them to emulate voters possessed of greater factual understanding and thus cast 
votes in the same ways they would if they had fully informed themselves about the issue.93 
Remember that MPs are generalists and Ministers are amateurs. That is not a criticism. The 
government and opposition have access to empirical evidence provided by, respectively, 
the expert public service and the Parliamentary Library. This of course can be disseminated 
to the public. Additionally, however, because “public policy is inherently normative”, there 
is no such thing as purely evidence-based policy.94 If there were, we could abandon 
democracy in favour of rule by the public service or some other technocratic elite, such as 
Plato’s philosopher king.95 All political decisions involve the application of values. Values 
are something for which it cannot be said that politicians are more qualified. Those who 
believe that one can arrive at a set of objectively right values through reasoning might be 
tempted to say that a legislature is better equipped to discern them than the people. 
However, by the time an MP reaches Parliament, his or her values will be largely set in 
stone. Parties only choose candidates whose ideology is known to be consonant to their 
own. 
C Unpalatable results 
 
Some oppose referenda on the basis that they tend to favour political positions with which 
those opponents disagree. However, Butler and Ranney preliminarily conclude that “the 
referendum is a politically neutral device that generally produces outcomes favoured by 
                                                 
92 At 39–40, 44. 
93 Arthur Lupia “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance 
Reform Elections” (1994) 88 Am Polit Sci Rev 63 at 72. 
94 Richard Shaw and Chris Eichbaum Public Policy in New Zealand: Institutions, processes and outcomes 
(3rd ed, Pearson, Auckland, 2011) at 9–10. 
95 Plato The Republic (H D P Lee (translator)) (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1963) at ch 7. 
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the current state of public opinion”.96 Thus, both the left and right can be found to oppose 
and support referenda.97 More recent evidence bears out this conclusion: direct democracy 
reorients policy towards the median vote’s preferences rather than any particular 
outcome.98 
 
For instance, one frequent objection to direct democracy is that Switzerland failed to 
introduce women’s suffrage until 1971.99 Male voters had rejected a 1959 attempt by the 
legislature to introduce the measure.100 Less well known is the record in the United States. 
Between 1867 and 1918, 49 state-level referenda on women’s suffrage were held in the 
US.101 Thirteen succeeded, and 36 failed. Colorado was the first to approve equal suffrage, 
in 1893 (following a defeat in 1877). In 1912, Arizona and Oregon passed CIR establishing 
women’s suffrage.102 Moreover, those successful referenda played an indispensable role in 
driving the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,103 which enfranchised women 
nationally.104 
D Tyranny of the majority 
 
This counterargument is largely self-explanatory. The majority will use its numerical 
superiority to benefit itself at the expense of the minority. 
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Firstly, majoritarian decision-making inevitably entails that the minority will not get the 
result it wants. As Roberts observes, “All democracies are based on the premise that, in the 
end, the votes are counted and one side wins”.105 The losing side will naturally have a 
partial view of whether the result constitutes tyranny. In reality, I believe that reasonable 
people of goodwill can disagree on most issues. To some extent, tyranny may be in the eye 
of the beholder. Thus, Obergefell v Hodges has been, on one hand, praised as a bulwark 
against the tyranny of the majority,106 and on the other, decried as judicial tyranny107 and 
a harbinger of majority tyranny.108 
 
Moreover, on the other side of the equation, CIR can be and have been used to check 
tyrannically majoritarian Parliaments.109 Furthermore, in Switzerland, many referenda 
proposals are submitted not in an attempt to gain victory at the polls but “with the intent to 
offer [their] withdrawal when bargaining for desired policy changes”.110 That is, they can 
be used to reach a compromise or, to put it another way, to extract concessions. This 
argument is unlikely to satisfy those who believe referenda are somehow more likely to 
produce tyranny than legislatures. Still, it should be taken into account when weighing the 
arguments for and against binding CIR. 
 
In New Zealand, Maori are the most obvious potential victim of majority tyranny. The 
simplest solution would be to make use of the existing dual electoral rolls and require a 
double majority from both the general and Maori electoral rolls to pass any referendum. 
This would give those who choose to identify as Maori a veto over any CIR, even those 
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which did not peculiarly affect Maori interests. Thus, I would not favour such a provision. 
Yet it is one possibility. 
 
Another would be to allow a veto by all three branches of government. Suppose that, under 
this system, the Attorney-General delivers an adverse s 7 NZBORA report on the CIR. He 
or she can then apply to the High Court for a declaration that the CIR unjustifiably breaches 
human rights. The judicial declaration triggers a parliamentary vote which, if adverse to 
the CIR, invalidates it. Requiring the concurrence of the three branches would minimise 
the risk of any one branch vetoing a policy on which reasonable people can disagree, in the 
name of protecting minority rights.  Given the choice between no direct democracy and 
direct democracy with human rights safeguards, I would of course choose the latter. 
 
Essentially, in New Zealand’s liberal political culture, there is little chance of anything 
which could genuinely be labelled tyranny. I do not think there is any greater risk of 
tyrannical referenda than a tyrannical Parliament. Not a single instance of this country’s 
long history of mistreatment of Maori resulted from a referendum. All such instances, 
following the beginning of representative government in 1854,111 can be attributed to those 
representative institutions.  
E Incompatibility with current governing arrangements 
 
Caldwell suggests that BCIR would be incompatible with representative democracy and 
parliamentary sovereignty.112 It is unclear why. Certainly, the fact that New Zealand 
democracy currently expresses itself by representation is not in itself an argument against 
BCIR. Dicey writes that ensuring that the will of the sovereign (that is, the law) and the 
will of the people coincide is the purpose of representative government and the reason 
                                                 
111 John Wilson New Zealand Sovereignty: 1857, 1907, 1947, or 1987? (Parliamentary Library, 
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Parliament became sovereign.113 If there be a better way to ensure that the law and the 
people’s will coincide parliamentary sovereignty and representative democracy cannot, on 
this basis, constitute a reason not to adopt this method. 
 
Caldwell continues: “Representative democracy would be undermined by referendums as 
the government would lose control of particular decisions and policies. Accountability for 
these decisions would also be lost if given over to popular vote.”114 This argument is 
echoed by Palmer,115 and Butler and Ranney.116 Yet this is precisely the point of BCIR. Of 
course the government would not be accountable to the people for the decisions the people 
made and the government did not. It would still be accountable for all of the decisions it 
did make. It would also be accountable for implementing the people’s will. Indeed, it ought 
to be easier to hold the government to account if there be a narrower range of outcomes for 
which it is responsible. 
 
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, however, argued that the frequent use of 
referenda would “blur the lines of accountability and responsibility of Governments and 
political parties”.117 Another argument that has been elided with the accountability 
argument is that referenda would diminish the effectiveness of elected governments.118 The 
argument seems to be that it would not be clear for which outcomes the government was 
or was not responsible. Thus, the government will be held responsible for outcomes for 
which it is not responsible and/or not be held to account for outcomes for which it is 
responsible. However, our democracy is built on the premise that the people have the ability 
to appraise a government’s performance. The people must be presumed to have the 
discernment to determine whether the government is to blame for a certain outcome or 
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whether some other factor—the opposition, a previous government, international economic 
conditions, or a referendum—is responsible. 
 
Ekins is concerned that the people would not be accountable as a lawmaker.119 One 
wonders why this should matter. An agent is required to account to its principal, but here 
there is no agency relationship. The people are still accountable, however, because their 
decisions affect them. If they were to make a foolish economic decision, they would bear 
the consequences. Also, where accountability for a wrong is required, the state, as the 
institutional embodiment of the people, will still be liable in the courts. Any compensation 
will come from the people’s taxes. 
 
F The intractability of parliamentary sovereignty 
 
Explicitly putting to one side the merits or otherwise of BCIR, Geddis points out that the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty renders BCIR an impossibility.120 He is right that, 
orthodoxly, Parliament cannot bind itself. However, here we must distinguish between 
parliamentary sovereignty as an empirical (if socially constructed) fact—as a legal doctrine 
accepted by all major constitutional actors and which the courts will enforce—and 
parliamentary sovereignty as something normatively valuable. To the extent that 
parliamentary sovereignty does have normative worth, it must stand or fall on the merits 
of representative legislation. I have already dealt with that aspect. 
 
This leaves parliamentary sovereignty as brute fact. Yet no one would argue that the dead 
hand of the Glorious Revolution should rule our society for all of eternity, simply because 
it is impossible to abrogate. It cannot be that, if ever a polity should adopt parliamentary 
sovereignty, it is forever “imprisoned by a doctrine”.121 If we reach a new constitutional 
settlement, constitutional actors will simply have to adapt to the change, even if it means 
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acquiescing in a legal revolution. Parliamentary sovereignty is constituted by its acceptance 
by senior legal officials in all branches of government122—and by the people.123 
G Referenda discourage compromise 
 
Butler and Ranney find referenda disturbing because they force voters “to choose between 
only two alternatives: they must either approve or reject the measure referred. There is no 
opportunity for continuing discussion of other alternatives, no way to search for the 
compromise that will draw the widest acceptance. Referendums by their very nature set up 
confrontations rather than encourage compromises.”124 The idea is that offering a binary 
‘yes/no’ choice is somehow too Manichaean and discourages consensus-building. I do not 
find this a convincing argument. To make a decision, one must choose either to accept or 
reject it. That is the same whether it be a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in a referendum or an ‘aye’ or 
‘no’ vote in Parliament. If the argument be that referenda allow decisions to be made by 
bare majority, then it is really a criticism of majoritarian decision-making and can also 
apply to Parliament. 
 
However, the argument may relate to the process leading up to the decision. A BCIR 
proposal can be crafted by a single person; the question remains static until the decision is 
made. In contrast, parliamentary decision-making can be characterised by bargaining, such 
that the proposal for decision itself reflects a compromise. However, I would point out that 
the operative word in the previous sentence is ‘can’. Governments can seek compromise. 
They also can and do force legislation through the House under urgency, without 
compromising, and with a simple majority. Indeed, this is one of the very problems which 
BCIR could check. While MMP requires that more than one party assent to a law, statutes 
still require only simple majorities.  
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Both Parliament and referenda have the potential to produce majoritarian decisions. While 
Parliament may be more likely to produce consensus, it has not been demonstrated that this 
is superior to majoritarian decision-making. Questioning majoritarianism calls into 
question the entire basis of our democracy. 
 
Finally, there is no principled reason why a referendum must be a yes/no choice. There is 
nothing to prevent a referendum question from offering multiple options, under a plurality 
or preferential vote system. That was the case under the national liquor licensing referenda. 
Indeed, we could adopt a system whereby the legislature produces a counter-proposal, as 
in Switzerland.125 This counter-proposal could itself represent the result of a 
compromise.126 
 
IV How BCIR would work in New Zealand 
 
I shall now set out an example of what institutional form BCIR might take. I do not commit 
myself to any particular instantiation. However, I shall demonstrate how proper 
institutional design can answer some of the counterarguments. In doing so, I draw in part 
from overseas experience with CIR and partly from my own thinking. 
A The referendum process 
 
The referendum process would begin with some group or individual identifying a public 
policy issue and deciding to resolve that issue with a BCIR. This person or group would 
then formulate a referendum question and submit it to the Clerk of the House for approval. 
Once approved, the sponsor could then begin collecting signatures.  
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I suggest that four per cent of registered voters127 would be an appropriate threshold. I 
consider the current ten per cent threshold to be too high. It is arguably causative of,128 and 
at least correlated with, the fact that only five CIR have been held in the decades since the 
CIR Act came into force. Comparatively, polities with a threshold of ten per cent or more 
have very few CIR, while those with a threshold of five per cent or less encourage greater 
participation in the process.129 Any threshold is inevitably arbitrary. However, four per cent 
is the level of support the Royal Commission on the Electoral System130 and the MMP 
Review panel131 determined to be an appropriate level of popular support for a political 
party to be represented in Parliament. It seems as good a threshold as any for determining 
the appropriate level of public support to place an issue on the popular legislative agenda. 
 
Ekins warns that professional signature gatherers could enable wealthy special interest 
groups to capture the agenda.132 This objection can easily be overcome. Restrictions or a 
prohibition could be placed on the use of professional signature-gatherers if this were 
considered desirable. Some polities have already done so.133 The referendum campaign 
process would be subject to campaign finance rules, which would dispatch the objection134 
that referenda results can be manipulated by the wealthy. 
 
Having obtained the requisite signatures, the next step would be for the promoters to work 
with the Parliamentary Counsel Office to produce a workable draft Bill. This would be a 
significant change from the present system, where the referendum question alone is put to 
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voters. However, most polities with CIR require drafts, and some also provide official 
assistance in the drafting process.135 
 
Presently, it is entirely up to the discretion of Parliament and the government to determine 
how the result is to be implemented. While this may provide flexibility, it also provides 
added scope for government attempts to subvert the result. Also, it will be much clearer 
that the implementation is the will of the people if the form of that implementation be 
published beforehand. 
 
After the draft Bill is prepared, it would then go before a Select Committee within whose 
ambit the subject matter of the Bill falls. Again, this would be a major point of difference 
with the present system. However, subjecting the Bill to Select Committee scrutiny would 
preserve some of the virtues of representative lawmaking. The submission process could 
also provide a focal point for the public debate. The attention of legislators and other 
submitters should ensure that the final draft is technically workable and accomplishes the 
object of the referendum question. The Select Committee’s recommendation, report, and 
any minority opinions would further help guide public debate. The Attorney-General’s 
office would, before the Select Committee process, provide a s 7 Bill of Rights Act report. 
This would no doubt receive attention in the debate and help to prevent any (at least 
unwitting) majority tyranny. 
 
The Select Committee process would also help work out any intricacies and nuances in the 
Bill’s implementation. Suppose, for instance, that the referendum question asked simply, 
‘Should euthanasia and physician assisted suicide be legal?’ The draft Bill may well leave 
important questions to be resolved, such as provisions for ensuring informed consent and 
protecting the consciences of doctors who adhere to Hippocratic ethics. It would be up to 
the Bill’s promoters to accept any recommendations. It would be in their interests to accept 
any recommendations that would improve the Bill’s workability—or the likelihood of its 
passing. 
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The Bill would finally be put before the Committee of the Whole House. The Committee 
would only have the power to make recommendations, which the Bill’s promoters could 
accept or reject. Subjecting Bills to the legislative process would help to ensure only the 
highest quality Bills went before the people. However, this would ensure that the Bill’s 
promoters, as representatives of the petitioners, retain control over their proposal. The final 
decision of course would be made by referendum.  
 
The Electoral Commission would issue an information pamphlet setting out the objective 
facts about the debate. The pamphlet would additionally set out the major arguments on 
either side, as in some US states.136 It would also contain recommendations on how to vote 
from all political parties represented in Parliament. It could also contain recommendations 
from major interest groups on either side. Thus, for instance, a euthanasia question may 
contain recommendations from groups such as the Catholic Church and Family First on the 
one side and the Voluntary Euthanasia Society on the other. The pamphlet would also 
contain links or information on how to access the extended reasoning behind each argument 
and position. 
 
If the referendum accepted the law change, the Bill would become law as per the usual 
process. I would leave the question of whether the Governor-General could refuse assent 
to unjust laws to be conducted on the same terms as the debate137 with regard to ordinary 
legislation. The government would be required to implement the law, just like any other. 
 
B Interpreting BCIR 
 
Finally, there is the question of how courts should interpret Bills passed by CIR. After all, 
the courts determine what the law means in practice. Currently, the courts’ aim in 
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interpreting statutes is to determine Parliament’s intent.138 This is a subset of the general 
rule that, “The object of all interpretation of a written instrument is to discover the intention 
of its author as expressed in the instrument”.139 It would follow, then, that the purpose of 
interpreting laws passed by referendum (‘direct laws’) would be to determine the will of 
the people as expressed in the statute. This must be determined objectively; it would be 
practically impossible to determine what voters subjectively intended. 
 
The courts would, as always,140 start with the plain meaning of the words. This is especially 
appropriate apropos referenda, for the ordinary meaning of the words is most likely to be 
the meaning understood by ordinary voters. The public are unlikely to be aware of special 
legal meanings.  
 
Where difficulties arise, the Act would be considered as a whole and in context. The 
referendum question would be an important part of that context. So, too, would the problem 
the referendum sought to address. The courts could also turn to extrinsic evidence, such as 
campaign materials and voter education pamphlets. 141 Anything that could play a role in 
shaping voters’ intentions would be relevant.142 
 
Note that, as Arnon argues, a narrow construction is more likely to reflect the people’s will 
than a wider interpretation.143 Some voters will interpret the statute more broadly than 
others.144 A narrow construction would ensure that only the interpretation accepted by 
everyone is applied.145 In other words, the lowest common denominator must be accepted. 
The sponsors may well want a broader meaning but draft the statute such that the voters 
approve more than they realise or would be prepared to accept.146 The question must always 
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be what the voters intend. The sponsors’ aims are relevant only to determining the voters’ 
intent. 
 
However, Arnon argues, this consensual understanding should receive higher normative 
treatment than ordinary statutes.147 Where a referendum conflicts with a statute, the former 
prevails.148 A general direct law should prevail over a specific statute.149 Also, a later 
statute should not prevail over a law passed by the people.150 Effectively, this would 
abrogate the doctrine of implied repeal to disallow a statute to repeal or amend a law passed 
by the people. The other side of the coin is that a direct law need not be quite so explicit 
about amending or repealing prior statutes.151 
 
That is not to say that it should be impossible to amend or repeal a direct law. Parliament 
should not be able to thwart the will of the people by undoing what the people have 
wrought. However, Parliament should have some capacity to make changes as problems 
with the law arise or circumstances change. The solution may be that Parliament can amend 
a direct statute, or suspend it pending repeal, but that that action would be subject to a veto 
referendum called by the original petitioners, or by anyone else with a lower threshold than 
ordinary.152 
 
C The importance of context 
 
Gregorczuk concludes that CIR are not intrinsically good or bad. Rather, they draw their 
character from the socio-political context in which they operate and the motives of the 
                                                 
147 At 88–89. 
148 At 94–95. 
149 At 94–95. 
150 At 94. 
151 Arnon, above n 8, at 95. 
152 Say, one per cent, which, rounded up from 0.83… per cent is approximately the level of popular support 
that would be required to elect an MP were there no threshold. 
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political actors involved.153 The success of BCIR would thus depend on the form the 
process took. The Devil, as they say, is in the details. That being said, the precise form does 
not matter so long as it remains consistent with the arguments I have advanced in favour 
of BCIR. This process I have sketched is far from the only possible form BCIR could take. 
The simplest would be simply to take the current CIR process and make it binding on the 
government. It would, presumably, then be left to the courts, at the suit of the promoters, 
to oversee the implementation of the CIR. If push comes to shove, I would prefer my 
example, for the reasons I have provided. However, the ultimate form would inevitably be 
decided upon by our elected representatives. If indeed they are as wise and enlightened as 
proponents of representative government believe, our representatives can surely be relied 
on to come up with a proposal that works. That proposal would then presumably be put to 
the people in a referendum. Thus, the very process of implementing BCIR would provide 
a model for future relations between the people and their Parliament.  
 
V Conclusion 
 
I have argued that CIR should bind the Crown. I made two main principled arguments. 
Firstly, I argued that implementing BCIR would accord greater recognition to individual 
rationality, freedom, and equality. They would make citizens more free and equal. 
Secondly, I argued that BCIR would make New Zealand more democratic. I next made a 
number of practical arguments. Firstly, BCIR could perform an agenda-setting function, 
which could see progress made on public policy issues not being dealt with adequately by 
representative institutions. Secondly, BCIR would provide a check on government power. 
Thirdly, BCIR could also check the power of various non-government actors that wield 
influence over the policymaking process. That concluded the positive case for BCIR. 
I then defended my position against various counterarguments. Space precluded me from 
responding to every conceivable counterargument (and from making every conceivable 
positive argument). However, I tried to cover the most common counterarguments.  I 
demonstrated, firstly, that direct democracy is not impractical in large societies. Secondly, 
                                                 
153 Helen Gregorczuk Citizens Initiated Referenda (Queensland Parliamentary Library, Research Bulletin No 
1/98, February 1998) at 31. 
33 In Defence of Direct Democracy: Towards a Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand 
 
the voters are competent enough for direct democracy. Thirdly, referenda are not biased in 
favour of certain results. Fourthly, direct democracy would not produce a tyranny of the 
majority. Fifthly, CIR would not be incompatible with current constitutional arrangements. 
Parliamentary sovereignty would not preclude the possibility of binding CIR. Finally, I 
exposed the flaws in the argument that referenda are incapable of producing compromise. 
Next, I exemplified how a system of BCIR could work. It differs significantly from the 
process under the current CIR Act. The referendum question should be accompanied by 
draft legislation. Once the promoters had collected the required signatures, the draft Bill 
would then be subject to the parliamentary process. The Electoral Commission would 
inform voters by setting out the facts and summarising the arguments about the proposal. 
If the referendum passed the Bill, it would become law. The courts would adopt a special 
approach to interpreting laws passed by referendum. This example is not meant to be set in 
stone, but rather to show how my theoretical argument could be given effect to in the real 
world. I leave it to those whose fulltime job it is to enact thoughtful legislation to determine 
the final form. 
One argument on which I have not yet touched is that in New Zealand, as in other Western 
countries, political participation is declining.154 The nonbinding nature of CIR only 
intensifies the people’s disillusionment and disengagement with the political process.155 If 
humans indeed be political animals, a lack of engagement with politics is a serious problem. 
Political institutions must not remain static in the face of changing trends in citizen 
engagement. Winston Churchill once said that democracy was “the worst form of 
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.156 He 
was right. However, it does not follow that the representative democracy of which 
Churchill spoke is the best possible form of democracy. A higher state of democracy may 
yet await us. Binding CIR could be part of such a state. That, ultimately, is what I have 
shown in this essay.  
                                                 
154 Miller, above n 79, 231. 
155 At 241. 
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